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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Right Against Treatment: Behavior Modification and
the Involuntarily Committed
In recent years there has been a readily observable trend to treat various
types of formerly criminal behavior in terms of illness, the cause of which
is to be sought in physical or psychological dysfunction rather than in terms
of mens rea.1 This trend has proceeded to such a degree that psychopaths,
juveniles, alcoholics, and drug addicts-all formerly criminals-have now
become deviants.2 Although this shift from retribution and deterrence to
therapy and rehabilitation has placed an emphasis on what might be broadly
termed "treatment" rather than punishment, nevertheless, the modalities of
the traditional penal system have in large measure been retained. For ex-
ample, incarceration for long, often indeterminate periods of time and the
employment of various "treatments" sometimes rather closely resemble soli-
tary confinement and hard labor in their painful effects. The danger in this
trend, of course, lies in the fact that the reclassification of many former
crimes as illnesses has withdrawn them from the protection and safeguards
which have been hammered out over the course of centuries in criminal law
and has placed them under the ill-defined parens patriae function of the
state-the paternal and therapeutic role derived from the notion of the be-
nevolent sovereign as guardian of the people."
Although the courts have already attempted to require mental hospitals
to provide treatment for patients involuntarily committed, 4 advancements in
the field of psychology-behavior control, drug therapy, conditioning and
psychosurgery-have given rise to the question whether there is a right
against treatment. The eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment has served well in the criminal area to check the zeal
1. "The criminal law in the United States has been undergoing a process of divest-
ment-a relinquishing of its jurisdiction over many of its traditional subjects and
areas." N. KiTrIE, THE RIGHT To BE DIFFERENT: DEVIANCE AND ENFORCED THER-
APY 4 (1971).
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id.
4. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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of correctional personnel and the so-called "hangin' judge," 5 but since the
landmark case of Robinson v. California,6 the application of therapeutic
techniques has been taken out of the "punishment" category and reclassified
as "treatment," thus withdrawing it from eighth amendment protection. It
would seem that the recognized technique of behavior modification,7 for ex-
ample, could be applied in all of its aspects as long as it could be justified
as treatment. In other words, it would be permissible to "make a bank rob-
ber want to vomit every time he saw a bank, . . . an armed robber shudder
every time he saw a gun." Whether or not the state has the authority
to so modify the behavior of an involuntarily confined mental patient has
been recently litigated in Knecht v. Gillman.9 This article will explore be-
havior modification as it is in fact practiced in our mental hospitals, the issue
of whether there exists a right against such treatment, and, if so, the basis
for its assertion.
Drug therapy, specifically apomorphine, was the technique of behavior
modification used in the Knecht case. The effect of apomorphine is to in-
duce a period of vomiting lasting from fifteen minutes to an hour.10  Appel-
lants, Gary Knecht and Ronald Stevenson, were confined at the Iowa Secu-
rity Medical Facility (ISMF) where they were subjected to the apomorphine
treatment which they alleged was without their consent and constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. The ISMF
is "an institution for persons displaying evidence of mental illness or psy-
chological disorders and requiring diagnostic services and treatment in a se-
5. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Rudolph v. Alabama, 375
U.S. 889 (1963). See Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Jones
v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Hamilton v. Schrio, 338 F. Supp.
1016 (E.D. La. 1970); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
6. 370 U.S. 660 (1972).
7. Behavior modification can be defined as the training of an organism through
punishment and reward to act in a specific way when confronted with a particular stim-
ulus. For purposes of this article, the pertinent method is aversion therapy which em-
ploys negative reinforcement, i.e., an unpleasant stimulus either associated with or con-
sequent upon a particular behavior. The goal of this technique is to develop a connec-
tion between the behavior and the unpleasant stimulus, thus forcing the subject to cease
the undesirable behavior. Anthony Burgess' novel, A Clockwork Orange (1962), pro-
vides an example of this technique. By repeatedly pairing an injection of a nausea-
producing drug with pictures of violently aggressive behavior, Burgess' main character
was conditioned to be overcome with extreme nausea every time he became involved
in such behavior. See generally Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to
"Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?" Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 616, 627-31 (1972).
8. Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 433 (1970).
9. 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973).
10. Id. at 1137.
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curity setting."" Apomorphine was administered to patients with "behavior
problems," which, according to testimony at the trial, consisted of not get-
ting up, giving cigarettes against orders, talking, swearing, or lying. 12 Any
other inmate or any staff member could report on these violations, and an
intra-muscular -injection of the drug would then be given by a nurse. It
was not necessary that any nurse or doctor observe the misbehavior, and
the specific authorization of a doctor was not required. The drug was ad-
ministered in a room near the nurses' station which contained only a toilet.
Whether the appellants' consent was obtained prior to subjecting them to
aversion therapy is not clear from the opinion. The court noted that the
drug had been administered without consent a few times prior to appellants'
experience, but went on to state that at the time of trial ISMF authorities
required a signed consent -form. The court, however, pointed out three ob-
jectional areas of the treatment: (1) the authorities did not permit the in-
mate to withdraw his consent once given; (2) the approval of a physician
was not required prior to each injection; and (3) the drug was administered
upon reports of fellow inmates.' 8
Treatment or Punishment?
Due to the fact that ISMF receives persons committed under civil statutes
and persons committed prior to conviction, the court emphasized that the
procedures employed at the institution must be non-penal in order to justify
the incarceration of such -persons and the compromise of their constitutional
rights. Moreover, since the purpose of ISMF according to statute' 4 is ex-
amination, diagnosis, and treatment, the institution would be in violation of
state law were it to employ penal measures. The court concluded, therefore,
that since the administration of drugs is treatment, the administration of apo-
morphine "can be justified only if it can be said to be treatment."' 5  The
11. Id. at 1138. More specifically, "[t]he patients admitted to the facility may orig-
inate from the following sources:
1) residents of any institution under the jurisdiction of the department of social
services;
2) commitments by the courts as mentally incompetent to stand trial under
Chapter 783 of the Iowa Code;
3) referrals by the court for psychological diagnosis and recommendations as
part of the pretrial or presentence procedure or determination of mental'com-
petency to stand trial;
4) mentally ill prisoners from the county and city jails for diagnosis, evaluation,
or treatment.
Section 223.4, Code of Iowa, 1973." Id.
12. Id. at 1137.
13. id. at 1138.
14. See note 11 supra.
15. 488 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added).
(Vol. 23: 774
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court thus seemingly required a very strict criterion, namely, that only if
apomorphine is treatment can it then be used at ISMF, a non-penal insti-
tution. Nevertheless, the court then proceeded to equivocate. If "it is not
possible to say that the use of apomorphine is a recognized and acceptable
medical practice in institutions such as ISMF,"'16 then it may be used pro-
vided the subject consents. The court retreated from its original criterion
(that apomorphine must be treatment) to one where the use of apomorphine
is possible as long as it cannot definitely be said not to be treatment, and
as long as there are appropriate safeguards. The reason for this shift in
emphasis is not clear from the opinion, but since the court later provided
for the withdrawal of consent at any time, the discussion becomes merely
academic. In effect, the court's definition of informed consent will probably
result in the elimination of the use of apomorphine at ISMF.
From Punishment to Required Treatment
The Knecht case, perhaps the first court test of aversion therapy, comes at
the end of a recent development in the law which began with the removal
of deviants from the traditional criminal law process. Initially, -this was seen
as humane as, for example, the new definition of criminal insanity 17 formu-
lated by Chief Judge Bazelon in 1954 which abandoned the century-old
M'Naghten test.' 8 Hailed as a liberal and enlightened decision at the
time, 19 it ironically had the effect of giving psychiatric examination and di-
agnosis such legal force that many defendants found themselves incarcer-
ated in mental institutions for indeterminate lengths of time with little hope
of release. In Robinson v. California20 the Supreme Court gave constitu-
tional sanction to the removal of deviants from criminal law. In that case,
the Court held that drug addiction '(as distinguished from the possession,
use, and sale of narcotics) was an illness and thus not punishable under
16. Id. The court noted the conflicting expert opinions on the medical acceptability
of apomorphine therapy. Dr. Fox stated that "behavior modification by aversive
stimuli is 'highly questionable technique' and that only a 20% to 50% success is
claimed." He further testified that "its use is really punishment." Dr. Loeffelholz, on
the other hand, testified that "there had been a 50% to 60% effect in modifying be-
havior by the use of apomorphine at ISMF." Id. at 1138.
17. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). "The rule ... is
simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product
of mental disease or mental defect." Id. at 874-75.
18. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843). "[Tlo
establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that ...the
party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature or quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong." Id. at 722.
19. N. KrrRiu, supra note 1, at 46. See Fortas, Implications of Durham's Case,
113 AM. J. PsYcHuTRY 577 (1957).
20. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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criminal law sanctions. 21 The Court based its decision on the eighth amend-
ment's prohibition against "cruel and unusual punishments," which formerly
had been applied only to prohibit punishment disproportionate to the of-
fense. 22
In time, however, the courts became increasingly aware of the vast power
they had invested in 'the therapists by removing large numbers of former
criminals not only from criminal law sanctions but also from criminal law
due process protections. Consequently, the courts began to take steps to
restrict the broad parens patriae powers of the state through due process
guarantees. In the Supreme Court, the movement to protect those outside
the traditional judicial process of criminal law occurred in the area of pro-
cedural due process. In re Gault,23 for instance, accorded juveniles the
minimal requirements of procedural due process. More recently, the Court
in Jackson v. Indiana24 moved to insure due process in commitment proce-
dures by invalidating the commitment of a mentally retarded deaf mute on
the basis of his incompetency to stand trial on a criminal offense. The
Court held that such a person
cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary
to determine whether there is a substantial probability ,that he will
attain [the capacity to stand trial] in the foreseeable future. If
it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either
institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be
required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the
defendant. 25
Lower federal courts have been active in the area of substantive due proc-
ess. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, the same court which
decided Durham,20 sought to insure that the involuntarily committed would
not merely languish in mental hospitals for indeterminate periods, but would
receive treatment. In Rouse v. Cameron,27 that court found a right to treat-
ment derived primarily from the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill
Act, but it also mentioned arguments for such a right based solely on con-
stitutional guarantees. Since Rouse, one federal district court 28 has ex-
21. Since Robinson, efforts have been made to test the validity of criminal sanctions
for chronic alcoholics. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Easter v. District
of Columbia 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 U.S. 66 (1962).
22. This principle was reiterated in Rudolph v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 889 (1963).
23. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
24. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
25. Id. at 738.
26. See note 17 supra.
27. 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Note, supra note 7, at 641.
28. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). See Note, supra note 7, at
645.
[Vol. 23:774
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panded the right to treatment into a right to rehabilitation which would ap-
ply to ordinary criminals as well as the mentally disturbed, and which would
compel prison authorities to institute positive programs designed to return
prisoners to normal life rather than merely confine them behind bars.
Cruel and Unusual Treatment?
It is in this context that the Knecht case attempted to improve on Robinson
by extending eighth amendment protection to non-criminals and to parallel
Rouse with a right against treatment. The Knecht analysis began with Trop
v. Dulles29 which the court saw as authority for the proposition that although
apomorphine aversion therapy may be therapy, it nevertheless can be re-
viewed under eighth amendment standards. In Trop, the Supreme Court
said that "even a clear legislative classification of a statute as 'nonpenal'
would not alter the fundamental nature of a plainly penal statute."30  Thus,
the Knecht court denied the distinction between penal and non-penal which
has in the past been used to justify such practices as involuntary sterilization,
found to be constitutional in Buck v. Bell3I and Skinner v. Oklahoma.32
Professor Kittrie notes:
The argument that involuntary sterilization constitutes "cruel and
unusual" punishment has been . . . unfruitful. The courts have
avoided the constitutional confrontation by characterizing the in-
sane or feeble-minded as non-criminals and the operation as non-
punitive. Since sterilization is designed for social improvement and
not punishment, the courts hold, it is not subject to the limitations
imposed upon criminal punishment. 33
By scrutinizing the "fundamental nature" of the non-penal apomorphine
treatment, the Eighth Circuit concluded:
Whether it is called "aversive stimuli" or punishment, the act of
forcing some one to vomit for a fifteen minute period for commit-
ting some minor breach of the rules can only -be regarded as cruel
and unusual unless the treatment is being administered to a pa-
tient who knowingly and intelligently consented to it.34
If, according to Trop, it is not whether a particular procedure is called treat-
ment or punishment, but whether in the particular case such procedure may
by its nature be considered cruel and unusual, then it is submitted that the
29. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
30. Id. at 95.
31. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
32. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The sterilization was actually disallowed, but on the
grounds that the specific exemption of embezzlement from the class of felonies involv-
ing moral turpitude was an unreasonable classification and a denial of equal protection.
33. N. KIrrlRi, supra note 1, at 319.
34. 488 F.2d at 1139-40.
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very nature of involuntary sterilization is as much cruel and unusual punish-
ment as apomorphine aversion therapy. Consequently, Buck and Skinner
under the broader Trop test would probably be decided differently.
The exposure of all treatments to eighth amendment scrutiny raises the
question of new standards. In Trop, the Court suggested that each case
should be decided in the light of "the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."13 5  The vagueness of this stand-
ard is evident from the fact that most eighth amendment decisions since
Trop have been on an ad hoc basis.A6  Furthermore, this standard is vul-
nerable to the behaviorists' claims that their techniques represent "the prog-
ress of a maturing society." What is needed is some other standard which
provides more guidance but remains flexible enough to respond to advances
in psychology. Psychological theories of motivation, specifically those of
R.B. Cattell and A.H. Maslow, can shed some valuable light on this perplex-
ing problem.
Hierarchy of Motivation
The theories of both Cattell and Maslow postulate a hierarchy of motivation,
i.e., they attempt to rank the instinctual forces in the human psyche accord-
ing to their relative strengths, the most basic being the strongest. These in-
stinctual forces are innate and hereditarily determined.
Cattell calls these instinctual forces "ergs" and characterizes each of them
as inherent dynamic patterns. According to Dr. Stagner,
Each erg or instinct has three attributes: the person tends to per-
ceive more promptly certain classes of objects related to that erg;
he tends to experience certain emotions in relation to these ob-
jects; and he starts on a course of action which ceases when a spe-
cific goal activity is achieved.37
The sexual erg, for example, would exhibit the following attributes: the
perception of appropriate sex objects, sexual arousal as to these objects, and
sexual effort resulting in some form of consummation. Cattell did not spe-
cify the exact number of human ergs, but he did work out a list of fourteen
35. 356 U.S. at 101.
36. The following have been found to be cruel and unusual punishment: the death
penalty when applied arbitrarily, Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); penal incar-
ceration for status, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); civil commitment for
status without treatment, Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); strip-
rooms and solitary confinements, LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); tranquilizing drugs, Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F.
Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972); corporeal punishment of prisoners, Jackson v. Bishop, 404
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
37. R. STAGNER, PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSONAL=rrY 301 (1961).
[Vol. 23: 774
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ranked according to relative strength.38 He measured the relative strengths
by noting "memory for words and pictures relating to the erg; galvanic skin
response to such words or pictures; reported interest in the class of stimuli;
reported time and money expenditures on a class of stimuli,"3 9 etc. Cattell
himself admitted that these classifications were only probable, but he did
point out the following convincing criteria:
(1) a similar pattern in mammals, especially primates, indicating
a biological basis for the erg; (2) a universal pattern appearing
in a wide diversity of cultures; (3) the pattern of attention, emo-
tion, and response mentioned above, despite environmental varia-
tions; (4) an accompanying unlearned facial and visceral pattern
of expression; (5) presence at birth; (6) powerlessness of training
to eliminate this propensity. 40
Maslow also proposed a hierarchy of motivations, but he differs from Cat-
tell in two respects. 4' First, Maslow's hierarchy is based on need, with the
corollary that the physiological needs must be satisfied before the "higher"
needs even manifest themselves. Cattell's ergs were supposed to be present
at all time, differing only in their degree of intensity. Second, Maslow's cate-
gories are very general and are thus more in keeping with the certitude of
38. Table 13.1
Cattell's List of "Ergs" Arranged
in Order of Relative Strength
Coleman and
Erg McRae's Cattell's
method* method
Mating 1 1
Self-assertion 6 2
Pugnacity 5 3
Repugnance 9 4
Appeal Not included 5
Hunting Not included 6
Laughter Not included 7
Self-abasement 2 8
Construction Not included 9
Flight 3 10
Curiosity 7 11
Protection 4 12
Gregariousness 8 13
Acquisition 10 14
* Colman and McRae, according to Cattell (1950), used the magni-
tude of the GSR [Galvanic Skin Response] to a variety of stimuli to
obtain indices of strength of mobilization in these various areas. Cat-
tell's ranking is a composite based on attention to and memory for
activities, words, and pictures in each area.
SOURCE: Cattell (1950), p. 192. Reprinted by permission of Mc-
Graw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
Id. at 302.
39. Id. at 301.
40. Id. at 301-02.
41. Id. at 303.
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his method. Maslow characterized his innately determined needs as "in-
stinetoid" to distinguish them from instincts which are more specifically fo-
cused. There are five groups of basic needs: (1) the physiological needs;
(2) the safety needs; (3) the belonging-love needs; (4) the need for es-
teem; (5) the need for self-actualization. 42 Each group of needs in ascend-
ing order must be fulfilled before the next group of needs makes its appear-
ance. On the first level, the physical needs must be fulfilled before the second
group (which include freedom from pain, discomfort, threat, and unfamiliar,
disturbing stimuli) makes its appearance. When these are satiated in turn,
they weaken and the third level appears. This level includes sex and its
various derivatives love, friendship, desire for children, acceptance in a
group), which, when satisfied, yield to a desire for prestige, recognition, and
fame. Finally, when all the others are relatively satisfied, man feels a need
for self-actualization which Maslow has vaguely defined as "man's desire for
self-fulfillment" or "the desire to become more and more what one is, to
become everything that one is capable of becoming. '48
Proposal: An Eighth Amendment Hierarchy
The crux of the motivational theories of both Cattell and Maslow is that
human instincts or needs are hierarchical, i.e., that some outweigh others in
importance, even to the degree that satisfying some is a necessary precondi-
tion for the manifestation of others. This basic hierarchical principle may
be an appropriate vehicle for a solution of eighth amendment standards of
cruel and unusual punishment. The starting point of such a theory would
have to be the inclusion of "treatment" under the domain of the eighth
amendment. This would necessitate an abandonment of the Buck and Skin-
ner decisions insofar as they distinguished punishment and treatment. Ac-
tually, this would not be a radical step given the Trop decision which di-
rected the courts' attention to the nature of a supposedly non-penal statute.
Any therapy, therefore, would be reviewable according to eighth amend-
ment standards. These standards would be based on a general need hierar-
chy, so that the more basic the need, the broader the constitutional protec-
tion. This need hierarchy would of necessity draw upon current psycholog-
ical theory and common sense. Maslow's theory, for example, could be em-
ployed in such a way that all level one needs (the biogenic and homeo-
static) 44 would have the broadest constitutional protection-a per se viola-
42; Id. Maslow also added (6), the desire to know and understand, and (7), the
aesthetic needs. The kernel of his theory, however, involves the first five. The last
two seemingly were added as an afterthought.
43. Id.
44. Homeostatic needs are those necessary to maintain equilibrium in bodily func-
tions.
[Vol. 23: 774
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tion of the eighth amendment-while level two needs (safety) could be per-
missibly abridged with informed consent where practicable. 45  Although
broad constitutional protection of level one needs is fairly straightforward
(especially given the fact that level one needs are fairly easy to identify),
level two needs, embracing freedom from pain, discomfort, threat, and un-
familiar, disturbing stimuli, are commonly infringed even in everyday life.
What is meant in the treatment context, however, is the unnecessary in-
fringement of this freedom, the result of a positive intent on the part of
the authorities to cause pain, discomfort, etc., above and beyond the com-
mon and unavoidable unpleasantness which naturally arises from the hos-
pital-prison setting. Incarceration itself is certainly a discomfort, but it is
part of the very essence of a prison and thus takes on a "normality" within
that limited context. A physical beating, on the contrary, would be an in-
fringement of the need to be free from pain, discomfort, etc., even in a
prison setting.46  The use of apomorphine for aversion therapy purposes,
without consent, would also be an infringement of the need to be free from
unfamiliar, disturbing stimuli even in a mental hospital context. Of course,
the problem then becomes one of fitting the disturbing stimuli (such
as shock therapy routinely administered in mental hospitals) into this
scheme since they presumably would not be permissible without consent.
The solution may indeed lie in banning such therapies, but a middle ground
may also be devised in terms of capacity for informed consent.
47
The above proposal suffers from the deficiency of being inspired by the
theories of Cattell and Maslow, which admittedly are theories and not based
upon incontrovertible facts. Nevertheless, they are not entirely without sup-
porting data and are probably no less certain than many psychological judg-
ments. Furthermore, one need not depend upon the levels proposed by
Maslow and Cattell in order to be convinced of the existence of a hierarchy
of human needs in general. The recognition of a hierarchy of human needs
and a determination from all the psychological data currently available could
at least lead to a further determination of the broad outlines of what basic
human needs deserve comprehensive protection, those which can only be
abridged with consent of the subject, and those free from such procedural
constraint. Such a step would be at least an attempt to introduce some
viable standard in the confused realm of the eighth amendment where soli-
45. "Informed consent" will be discussed on pp. 784-85 infra.
46. The prison setting presents a problem for this proposal as long as the classical
criminological theory is adhered to. If the criminal's incarceration is not seen by the
state as the sole form of punishment imposed by his sentence, maximization of the un-
pleasantness and discomfort of prison life may be perceived as a desirable goal. Such
a view would be incompatible with the proposed theory.
47. See p. 784 infra.
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tary confinement has been found intolerably cruel under some circumstances
while sterilization is at the same time countenanced. 48
Informed Consent
The key factor which overcomes any eighth amendment objection in Knecht
is consent, 49 and to insure a free and informed consent the court framed
its remedy in terms of procedural safeguards. The court ruled that the sub-
ject's written consent must be obtained, that he may revoke it at any time,
and that each apomorphine injection must be individually authorized by a
doctor who was to rely on information based on the personal observation
of staff members. 50 This directive would in effect prohibit apomorphine
aversion therapy, since it is hard to imagine an inmate not withdrawing his
consent after one hour-long session of vomiting. Indeed, the general ques-
tion of informed consent from persons determined to be legally incompetent
is at issue here. A catatonic schizophrenic, for example, who cannot give
even the time of day, certainly cannot give informed consent. A severely
paranoid person may be loathe to sign anything. This dilemma has often
resulted in a justification for blanket parens patriae power over anyone le-
gally committed.
However, the argument that legal commitment deprives a person of ca-
pacity to give informed consent is both dangerous and simplistic. The law
has long recognized that a person may be incompetent for some purposes
while perfectly capable for others. Competency to make a will, for in-
stance, may exist simultaneously with incompetency to make a contract. It
is necessary to determine from the ability of the person to communicate and
48. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973).
49. 488 F.2d at 1140.
50. "In this case the trial court should enjoin the use of apomorphine in the treat-
ment of inmates at the ISMF except when the following conditions are complied with:
1. A written consent must be obtained from the inmate specifying the nature of
the treatment, a written description of the purpose, risks and effects of treat-
ment, and advising the inmate of his right to terminate consent at any time.
This consent must include a certification by a physician that the patient has
read and understands all of the terms of the consent and that the inmate is
mentally competent to understand fully all of the provisions thereof and give
his consent thereto,
2. The consent may be revoked at any time after it is given and if an inmate
orally expresses an intention to revoke it to any member of the staff, a revoca-
tion form shall be provided for his signature at once.
3. Each apomorphine injection shall be individually authorized by a doctor and
be administered by a doctor, or by a nurse. It shall be authorized in each in-
stance only upon information based on the personal observation of a memh r
of the professional staff. Information from inmates or inmate aides of thz ob-
servation of behavior in violation of an inmate's protocol shall not be sufficient
to warrant such authorization." Id. at 10.
[Vol. 23:774
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from the nature of his illness whether he is capable of giving informed con-
sent.51 If he is not, then resort should be made to a neutral decision-maker
before treatment can ,begin. This sort of plan, of course, depends upon a
good faith evaluation of the capacity to consent on the part of psychiatric
experts. Psychiatrists who do not value human autonomy or who look upon
any refusal of treatment as a product of mental illness could effectively frus-
trate -the system.
The Right to Privacy
A constitutional right to privacy, although not mentioned in the Knecht case,
may provide an additional argument against involuntary subjection to be-
havior therapy. Griswold v. Connecticut52 found such a right in the "pe-
numbras" of the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments, as well as in 'the
ninth, specifically with regard to the "marital bed." Stanley v. Georgia53
asserted a right to be free from "unwanted governmental intrusions into
one's privacy" with regard to mere possession of obscene matter. This right
to be let alone or the general right to privacy may appropriately be applied
to prohibit non-consensual behavior therapy.
A first amendment right to generate ideas was recently found to protect
an involuntarily confined mental patient from psychosurgery in Kaimonitz
v. Michigan Department of Mental Health.5 4 Basing its argument on a right
to privacy and citing Griswold, Stanley, and Roe v. Wade,55 the court said:
Intrusion into one's intellect, when one is involuntarily detained
and subject to the control of institutional authorities, is an intrusion
into one's constitutionally protected right of privacy. If one is not
protected in his thoughts, behavior, personality and identity, then
the right of privacy becomes meaningless. 56
Of course, the drastic nature of psychosurgery with its literal intrusion into
the brain lends itself more readily to the Kaimonitz analysis than does be-
havior therapy. When a drug such as apomorphine is used, although there
is an intrusion in the form of an injection, the actual change in the subject's
intellect is a normal reaction to a stimulus, similar to a child's learning to
respect fire after having once been burned; apomorphine does not in and
of itself change the subject's physical makeup. This effect is common to
51. By allowing the appellants to bring suit, the Knecht court impliedly recognized
the principle that a determination of legal incompetency was not necessarily a determi-
nation of incapacity in all areas.
52. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
53. 394 U.S. 557 (1968).
54. 42 U.S.L.W. 2063 (1973).
55. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
56. 42 U.S.L.W. at 2064.
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other prison disciplinary measures such as solitary confinement which seek
to change an inmate's behavior by means of aversive stimuli. Thus, any
argument in terms of a right of privacy aimed at apomorphine therapy would
run the risk of embracing traditional punishments as well. Surely, prison
itself is fashioned to be a denial of privacy. A right of privacy argument
would seem to have more promise in the context of preservation of bodily
integrity from drastic measures.
Conclusion
In -the face of the ever-increasing power of the social engineers, a right
against treatment has begun to emerge parallel to a previously formulated
right to treatment. 57 The Knecht case employed the eighth amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to protect an inmate from non-
consensual behavior modification. To do so, it was necessary to include
treatment within the meaning of "punishment," a departure from the seman-
tic distinction which had protected such practices as sterilization from eighth
amendment scrutiny. Authority for this step was seemingly provided by
Trop, yet Buck has not been overruled. A definitive solution, therefore,
would be for the Supreme Court clearly to apply the eighth amendment to all
so-called "treatments" inflicted upon those involuntarily committed to men-
tal institutions. Such a decision would lay a firm foundation for a judicial
evolution of a right against treatment protected by a flexible, yet compre-
hensible eighth amendment standard. Contemporary psychological theory
has much to contribute to the articulation of this standard. The theories
of Cattell and Maslow, for instance, provide an amenable framework in
postulating a hierarchy of human needs. If courts were to judge "cruel and
unusual" according to three ranges on a hierarchy of need in which the
most basic human needs would be given per se protection, the next range
conditional protection (i.e. informed consent) and a third range in which
the state would be given broad discretion in exercising the parens patriae
power, then considerable progress would -be made over the present ad hoc
"evolving standard of decency" test.
The judicial acceptance of a three-range hierarchy of human need stand-
ard, however, necessitates a simultaneous acceptance of an elaborated notion
of informed consent. Unless there is a basic commitment to the recognition
of human autonomy even among those legally incompetent, the second range
would be absorbed into the first by conditioning capacity to consent upon
a determination of legal competence. Safeguards must be established so
that only those persons who are actually incapable of giving consent would
57. See pp. 777-79 supra.
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